

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 143753
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY TEXT AS RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE
APPROVED BY EA - MR. GLEYSSTEEN
S/S-O - RCASTRODALE
EA/K - MR. RICH

-----090956 070436Z /20

P 070213Z JUN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 143753

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: OVIP (BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW), PEPR, MARR, KS, US

SUBJECT: DR. BRZEZINSKI'S MEETING WITH ROK PRIME
MINISTER CHOI

1. FOLLOWING IS APPROVED MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF
MEETING MAY 25, 1978 AT THE ROK PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE IN
SEOUL BETWEEN ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AND ROK PRIME MINISTER
CHOI KYU-HAH.

2. ACCOMPANYING DR. BRZEZINSKI WERE AMBASSADOR SNEIDER
AND EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR CLARK. ON THE KOREAN SIDE
FOREIGN MINISTER PARK TONG-JIN WAS ALSO PRESENT.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

(A) THE PRIME MINISTER REQUESTED DR. BRZEZINSKI'S OPINION
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 143753

OF THE CURRENT VIEW IN PEKING.- DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID HE WAS
STRUCK WITH THE REALISM OF THE LEADERSHIP AND THE EMPHASIS
ON INTENSE MODERNIZATION WITH A RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY.
WHILE THERE WAS STILL A GREAT DEAL OF EMPHASIS ON SELF-
RELIANCE, THIS WAS NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF DOWNGRADING
RELATIONS WITH THE ADVANCED COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. THE
PRIME MINISTER NOTED THAT WHILE CHAIRMAN HUA WAS IN PEKING

FOR MEETINGS WITH KIM IL-SONG THERE HAD BEEN NO JOINT STATEMENTS, BUT DURING THE VISIT HUA HAD MADE SEVERAL STATEMENTS. IN REVIEWING THESE THE PRIME MINISTER FOUND NO SHIFT IN THE TOUGH POSITION ON KOREA. DR. BRZEZINSKI AGREED THAT IN GENERAL THE POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED BUT THAT THERE WAS A REALIZATION AND REALISTIC UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP OF THE POWER RELATIONS IN THE REGION. THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED THAT AT A BANQUET FOR A JAPANESE SOCIALIST DELEGATION IN PYONGYANG IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE NORTH KOREANS REJECTED ANY POSSIBILITY OF TRIPARTITE DIALOGUE AND HE ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY VIEWS ON THAT IN CHINA. DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID THAT IN GENERAL NORTH KOREAN INTEREST IN A DIALOGUE IS PRIMARILY TO HAVE ONE WITH THE U.S. WHICH WOULD BE DESIGNED TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE ROK AND THAT THE U.S. HAS HAS NO INTEREST IN SUCH DISCUSSIONS.

(B) THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT IN THE SOUTH KOREAN VIEW DIALOGUE SHOULD BE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH; HOWEVER, THESE TALKS HAD BEEN BROKEN OFF. EVEN THE RED CROSS TALKS WHICH HAD BEEN CONTINUED AFTER POLITICAL TALKS WERE SUSPENDED IN AUGUST 1973 HAD BEEN CUT OFF TWO MONTHS AGO. IN HIS VIEW THE NORTH HAD HOPED TO GAIN A POLITICAL ADVANTAGE FROM BILATERAL TALKS AND PERHAPS CAUSE DISSENSION IN THE SOUTH AND SEPARATE THE U.S. AND THE ROK. THIS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 143753

DID NOT HAPPEN. IN FACT, THE SOUTH BECAME STRONGER SO THAT THE NORTH SAW NO BENEFIT AND POSSIBLE LOSS FROM A CONTINUATION OF THE DIALOGUE AND HAD THEREFORE BROKEN OFF ALL CONTACT. HE REVIEWED FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI THE HISTORY OF NORTH-SOUTH COMMUNICATIONS FROM 1950 TO PRESENT.

(C) DR. BRZEZINSKI ASKED IF, IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S VIEW, THE NORTH MIGHT STILL TAKE A MILITARY INITIATIVE. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THE NORTH SAW TWO POSSIBILITIES FOR VICTORY IN THE SOUTH, EITHER MILITARY OR POLITICAL. IF IN THE VIEW OF THE NORTH THERE WERE TO BE POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC WEAKNESS IN THE SOUTH, THEN IT MIGHT WELL STILL TRY A MILITARY OPTION.

(D) THE PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT COMPENSATORY MEASURES WOULD ADVANCE IN PARALLEL WITH TROOP REMOVAL.

(E) DR. BRZEZINSKI POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESIDENT DECIDED TO REMOVE ONLY ONE BATTALION OF THE SECOND DIVISION THIS YEAR AS OPPOSED TO EARLIER PLANS TO REMOVE THREE. HE NOTED CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS WERE COMPLICATED BY ISSUES NOT RELATED TO SECURITY. HE SAID THAT WE HAD TRIED TO

SOLVE THESE COMPLICATIONS AND THAT ANY FURTHER ACTION ON THE KOREAN PART FOR THE SAME END WOULD BE HELPFUL AND

APPRECIATED.

(F) THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED THAT THE SECURITY OF KOREA AFFECTED THE SECURITY OF ALL OF NORTHEAST ASIA AND SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECTED TO INFLUENCE FROM OTHER PROBLEMS. HE DETAILED THE EFFORTS CURRENTLY BEING MADE BY THE ROK TO PROVIDE FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE, THE BURDEN THIS PLACED ON THE PEOPLE, AND THE DIFFICULTY OF BALANCING DEFENSE NEEDS AGAINST DEVELOPMENTAL REQUIREMENTS.

(G) DR. BRZEZINSKI NOTED THAT OUR REALIZATION OF THESE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 143753

PROBLEMS WAS WHY THE U.S. HAD OVER THE YEARS IN MANY AREAS OF THE WORLD ASSISTED IN SECURITY EFFORTS. HE TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE U.S. WAS DEVELOPING A RAPID STRIKE FORCE WHICH COULD BE USED WHEREVER REQUIRED AND ASSURED HIM THAT THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO KOREA WAS UNSHAKEABLE. HOWEVER, SINCE NORTH KOREA HAD ONLY ONE-HALF THE POPULATION AND ONE-THIRD THE GNP OF SOUTH KOREA, SOUTH KOREANS MUST ASSUME A PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THEIR DEFENSE BURDEN. ANY SOCIETY WHICH LOOKS TO OTHERS FOR ITS OWN SECURITY LOSES THE WILL TO MAINTAIN THAT SECURITY. DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID THIS HAD BEEN A PROBLEM IN VIETNAM BUT THAT CONDITIONS WERE VERY MUCH DIFFERENT TODAY IN KOREA.

(H) FINALLY, THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF JAPAN INCREASING ITS DEFENSE EXPENDITURES. DR. BRZEZINSKI SAID THAT THE JAPANESE SHOULD AND ARE DOING MORE IN THIS AREA. HE NOTED THAT HISTORY MAKES US ALL SOMEWHAT UNCOMFORTABLE WITH INCREASED JAPANESE DEFENSE EFFORTS BUT THAT A GRADUAL INCREASE IN THEIR EFFORTS IS ACCEPTABLE. HE NOTED THAT THE VIEW ON SECURITY IN JAPAN HAS CHANGED. THE COUNTRY IS NOW PREPARED TO DO MORE AND, IN ADDITION, BY CONTRIBUTIONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE ECONOMIC AREA, THE JAPANESE CAN ALSO HELP THEM DO MORE TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN ABILITY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY. END TEXT
VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRIME MINISTER, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, POLITICAL SITUATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE143753
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780237-0305
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780685/aaaacvlr.tel
Line Count: 161
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 18e1cc8f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 17 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2452463
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DR. BRZEZINSKI'S MEETING WITH ROK PRIME MINISTER CHOI
TAGS: OVIP, PEPR, MARR, KS, US, (BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW), (CHOI KYU-HAH)
To: SEOUL
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/18e1cc8f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014